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SECURITY LAB
IncidentsData & model poisoning

Microsoft's Tay: Poisoned into a Racist Bot in 16 Hours

Medium severityReal-world incidentMarch 2016LLM05: Data & Model PoisoningLLM01: Prompt Injection
Status: Tay was shut down within ~16 hours; Microsoft apologised and later released a constrained successor
Sources checked October 2026
On this page

The first viral lesson that a model which learns from the public will learn whatever the public feeds it.

WhenMarch 2016
TargetTay (experimental Twitter chatbot)
VendorMicrosoft
TechniqueFeedback-loop / online-learning poisoning
ImpactCorrupted in ~16 hours; taken offline after 95,000+ tweets
Attack flow
  1. 1Microsoft launches Tay, a chatbot that learns from its Twitter interactions
  2. 2A coordinated group floods it with hateful content and abuses “repeat after me”
  3. 3Tay absorbs the inputs and starts emitting racist/abusive content unprompted

What happened

Microsoft launched Tay in March 2016 as a self-learning chatbot that adapted from its public interactions. Users exploited that learning loop — including a “repeat after me” function — to feed it racist, sexist, and antisemitic content, which Tay absorbed and began emitting unprompted. Microsoft took Tay offline within about 16 hours (after more than 95,000 tweets) and apologised.

How it happened

Tay's training signal was its live, untrusted user input. Flooding that input with malicious content — and abusing an echo feature — poisoned the behaviour the model learned.

Root cause

Learning from untrusted input with no curation or gating. When adversaries control the training data, they control the model.

What a review would have caught

A threat model of the learning loop — “what happens if the inputs are adversarial and coordinated?” — plus abuse testing of the echo feature would have predicted this before launch.

How to prevent it

  • Curate and gate anything that enters a training/adaptation loop.
  • Don't learn from unfiltered public input in production.
  • Apply the same care to RAG memory and fine-tuning on user data — modern feedback loops.

Feel it yourselfThe replay lab poisons a model's behaviour through the data it learns from — the feedback-loop class.

FAQ

How was Tay poisoned?

Tay learned from its public interactions. A coordinated group flooded those interactions with racist and abusive content — and abused a “repeat after me” function — so the model absorbed and then reproduced it.

Is this really “poisoning”?

Yes — it's the canonical real-world case of online-learning / feedback-loop data poisoning: adversarial inputs corrupt the model's live training signal, changing its behaviour.

What's the modern lesson?

Any system that learns from untrusted user input (including RAG memory and fine-tuning on user data) can be poisoned. Curate and gate what enters the training/adaptation loop.

Replay this attack
Poison a model's behaviour through the data it learns from — the feedback-loop poisoning class.
Open the live lab
A live, sandboxed lab. It recreates the technique, not this exact product.